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PUBLIC SPACE LAUNCH ACQUISITION: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY
Capt Lee W. Rosen, USAF Upper Stages Pgm Office, LA AFB, CA 
Capt Ken Leeson, Defense Plant Repr. Office (GE), Evendale, OH
The opinions and conclusions in this paper are those of the authors 
and are not intended to represent the official position of the DoD, 
USAF, or any other government agency.
ABSTRACT
This study analyzes three commonly practiced approaches to 
Government acquisition of space launch services. These approaches 
are employed by the U.S. Air Force, the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, and the Strategic Defense Initiative 
Organization. Launch contracts which were representative of each 
organization's acquisition procedures were investigated and 
evaluated along several critical issues and elements of the space 
launch acquisition process. These issues included payload 
characteristics, government oversight, contractor incentives, 
insurance, liability and cost. The critical issues and elements 
were determined by using the Delphi method to survey 25 experts in 
the space launch field. Archival contractual data from the three 
government agencies were obtained and analyzed. The study found 
many inconsistencies among the different agencies' acquisition 
procedures. The paper ends with a recommendation for a hybrid 
acquisition approach encompassing the strengths of the three cases. 
The approach entails the use of positive and negative Contractor 
incentives, Government self-insurance, and streamlined commercial- 
like acquisition procedures.
RESEARCH FOCUS
The researchers conducted a case study that attempted to identify 
the differences among three commonly implemented approaches to 
government space launch. These three mechanisms included: 1) the 
Air Force approach to launch, which utilizes limited commercial 
procedures and significant government oversight; 2) the NASA launch 
service approach with contractually integrated government 
oversight; and 3) the establishment of a launch service contract 
that was purported to involve exclusive contractor supervision and 
liability. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) 
has contracted for launch services in this manner.
The Delta II launch vehicle was selected as a common reference of 
comparison for the case study. Documentation from the following 
Delta II launch contracts was obtained and analyzed in order to 
provide a comparison of acquisition processes: 1) Air Force - 
Delta II Follow-on, #91C0031, 2) NASA - MELV (Medium Expendable 
Launch Vehicle) Contract, 3) SDIO - Launch of the LACE/RME mission 
on a Delta II vehicle.
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DELPHI
Before the case study could be initiated, the researchers had to 
identify the areas (issues and elements) of the launch process that 
space launch experts believed to be critical for analysis. These 
areas were then examined in all three of the cases chosen for the 
study. In order to validate and determine the final list of 
critical issues and elements on which the three launch processes 
were compared, the researchers chose to employ the Delphi method. 
This technique is popular for gathering the judgements of experts 
on a particular subject (Ref. 6).
The experts who participated in this study were identified by the 
Researchers through a literature search, and through personal 
interview. The recruiting of participants was accomplished through 
the use of an introductory letter.
The researchers then developed an open ended questionnaire that 
asked the respondents to identify and define what they considered 
to be critical issues and elements of the space launch acquisition 
process. Once the first set of responses were received, the 
results were summarized and reported back to the experts in the 
form of a second survey. This follow-up survey asked respondents 
to choose, on a five point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree (1) 
to Strongly Agree (5), if a particular critical issue/element 
should be included in the study. From these two iterations of the 
delphi survey, the researchers reached a consensus of the critical 
areas of the space launch acquisition process.
CASE STUDY
A case study methodology was selected as the mechanism for 
comparing the three space launch approaches. This mechanism 
allowed for an in-depth study of the complexities and varieties of 
space launch service contracting.
The researchers established contacts at each of the three 
government agencies to act as the focal points for data collection. 
Archival data in the form of contract documentation and interoffice 
memoranda were collected for each launch in the study. Once 
collected, this written documentation was then segregated by issue 
or element and reviewed for completeness. If an area was not 
adequately described by the archival data, deficiencies were noted 
and questions that addressed the needed information were generated. 
Any questions that could not be answered in detail by the point of 
contact were noted. This point of contact was further queried for 
the names of experts that could finalize the unanswered questions. 
These persons were contacted in order to complete the collection of 
data.
DELPHI FINDINGS. ' • .
lit the open-ended survey, many of the r'espondents used
bullet/outline format to list their responses, while other
individuals used essay format to convey their thoughts. The
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researchers organized the results based on certain key words or 
concepts that were repeated by the respondents. When one of these 
key words or concepts appeared on the answer form, the researchers 
noted it, and kept a running tab on each category. The researchers 
organized the information into 13 separate categories which 
comprised the second iteration of the delphi survey. Respondents 
were asked to score each category and sub-category on its relative 
criticality using the five point Likert scale previously mentioned. 
After each category, respondents were given space for additional 
comments.
The means and modes for every item on the second survey averaged 
well over the Neutral (Likert scale 3) category. This finding 
suggests that a consensus of the experts felt that most of the 
items were, to some degree critical. The following list summarizes 
the final results of both iterations the the delphi survey, and was 
used as the outline by which comparisons were made across the three 
cases:
1 - Typical Payload Char.
2 - Oversight to Include: 
Contractor Required Tasks 
Contract Data Requirements
Listing (CDRLs) 
Military Specification 
Insight vs. Approval 
Launch Authority
3 - Contractor Incentives
4 - Liability/Insurance 
Third Party 
Government Property 
Launch Vehicle
5 - Cost of Launch Service
6 - Reliability
Findings of the Case Study. Typical Payload Characteristics Many 
Government officials have indicated the need for more oversight 
involving missions with high complexity, costly payloads, and 
national security implications. The intent of the comparison is to 
determine the relative expendability of the payload. This 
considers mission complexity, cost, and national security issues.
The Air Force Delta Launch Contract is primarily concerned with 
launching one satellite, the Navstar/GPS. The GPS will eventually 
include 21 of these $65 million satellites. The standardization 
that is a result of repeated missions has contributed to decreased 
mission complexity.
Virtually every payload, thus nearly every launch, under the NASA 
MELV Contract is unique. Although these scientific payloads do not 
necessarily have national security implications, most of these one- 
of-a-kind payloads are expensive (over $200 million). Like many of
the NASA missions, the SDIQ LACE/RME was a one-shot, highly 
complex, expensive mission (approximately $300' billion for the 
satellites). Unlike NASA, LACE/RME was directly linked with
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national security concerns. For these reasons, LACE/RME would be 
considered the least expendable payload of the three cases studied.
It follows that critical missions like LACE/RME should command more 
oversight throughout the procurement process. As the following 
analysis indicates, the researchers have perceived this to be the
opposite,
Oversight. Of the three cases studied, the Air Force Delta II 
Follow-On Contract appeared to support the most government 
involvement and oversight. Contractor required tasks were listed 
in greater number and detail than in both the NASA and SDIO launch 
contracts. The Air Force contract mandated almost every aspect of 
the launch process.
The NASA MELV contract focused on two critical Contractor 
requirements, both of which required Government approval and 
inclusion into the contract as compliance documents. The Mission 
Specification Document serves as a type of Contractor-prepared 
statement of work for the payload interface, environmental and 
vehicle system requirements. The other significant NASA document 
is the Performance Assurance Implementation Plan (PAIP). It is a 
Contractor-developed/Government approved document that deals with 
oversight functions such as safety, configuration management and 
reliability. Through these documents, NASA is able to ensure a 
significant level of oversight throughout the launch process.
The comparison of CDRLs among the three contracts produced similar 
results. The Air Force, once again, posted the highest number of 
Contractor required submittals. All of these mandatory documents 
required acceptance via a DD Form 250, and many required Government 
approval. This burden is somewhat eased by the fact that many of 
the 83 CDRLs are only required when the Contractor is launching a 
unique payload.
Although, the NASA CDRLs were not available, the existence of 50 
such submittal requirements approximates the Air Force contract 
documentation work load. This is especially true if one considers 
that nearly every NASA mission is unique and that many of the 
submittals will have to be altered significantly or reaccomplished 
for each launch.
The SDIO LACE/RME launch contract made use of only 12 CDRLs. None 
of these submittals required DD Form 250 acceptance or approval. 
In general, the intent of the CDRLs was to foster communication 
between the Contractor and the Government, and not dictate 
requirements.
Before comparisons are drawn concerning reliance on military 
specifications and standards, it is important to note that all 
Delta II vehicles are manufactured under the same quality 
processes, and to identical specifications (Ref. 7). Many of these 
standards have been implemented by Air Force contracts throughout 
the history of the system. In essence, the Air Force has provided 
the direction for the vehicle production. This is probably due to
the fact that the Air Force helped to develop the Delta vehicle, 
and has continued to be the largest customer for the Delta market. 
These realities are reflected in the disparity among contracts as 
to the number of compliance standards listed by each contract (Air 
Force-30, NASA-6, SDIO-1). The Air Force total is largely 
comprised of production standards. It was not possible to 
determine which standards are currently contributing to the overall 
success of the Delta system.
The Government holds final launch authority in all three cases, 
whereas, in a commercial launch, the service provider would make 
final decisions as to launch go/no-go. This is most likely due to 
the Government's insistence on self-insuring the payloads, and its 
ownership of all launch facilities. It would be impractical to 
give the Contractor the final say when it holds virtually no 
liability for the success of the mission. This is in contrast with 
a commercial launch, where the service provider is typically liable 
for the payload and launch facilities.
Throughout the analysis, it was readily apparent that the Air Force 
launch contract interjects Government involvement and oversight 
into the launch process to a greater degree than the NASA and SDIO 
contracts. The effect of the Air Force practices is to move away 
from the procurement of launch services in the pure sense 
(placement of a payload into a specified orbit for firm price). 
The SDIO contract, on the other hand has implemented a bona-fide 
performance specification for the LACE/RME launch. From an 
oversight perspective, SDIO has utilized commercial space launch 
procurement techniques. NASA's insistence on documents such as the 
PAIP have placed it in a position somewhere between the Air Force 
and SDIO on the oversight spectrum.
The most interesting aspect of the comparison in government 
oversight materializes when the mission and payload characteristics 
are considered. The Air Force contract deals with the most 
expendable payloads and the most standardized launch process of the 
three cases studied. However, it is the most oversight intensive 
document. Conversely, the oversight-scarce SDIO launch involved 
the least expendable payload and a fairly sophisticated launch 
process.
Contractor Incentives. One would expect that a contract with less 
oversight would require a greater degree of contractor incentives 
to ensure performance and vice versa. This expected correlation 
was exactly reversed for this case study. The Air Force contract 
contained the strongest form of Contractor incentive of the three 
cases. This was the requirement to re-fly any mission that failed 
as a result of Contractor error, at no cost to the Government. 
This translates into the potential for a contractor loss of 
approximately $40 million.
NASA also made use of a negative incentive, however, it was less 
sever than the Air Forces's. The NASA contract could penalize the 
contractor up to $5,330,000 for a mission failure, but could not 
request a reflight.
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In the Air Force and NASA launch agreements, the Contractor could 
also earn additional sums of money for successful or exceptional 
performance. The Air Force award fee criteria focused primarily on 
the processes that the Contractor implements throughout many phases 
of the contract. If, over time, the Contractor does an exceptional 
job of complying with the standards that the Air Force has mandated 
in the contract, the Contractor stands to receive the full $3 
million award fee.
NASA's positive incentives differ substantially from the Air 
Force's. A $1 million bonus is paid for each consecutive full 
mission success. The award fee is only tied to the final 
performance of a launch. NASA appears to be m6re concerned with 
the outcome of the launch and less concerned with the execution of 
certain launch processes. This is a step in the direction of 
commercial launch practices.
The SDIO LACE/RME procurement did not employ any special 
contractual incentives. The Contractor was guaranteed the full 
contract price regardless of the mission outcome. In fact, the 
Contractor was immediately paid $4.5 million at contract award. 
The reasoning for these payment procedures are not listed in the 
contract. Interestingly, the Advanced Payment Clause which would 
normally be required in this circumstance, was also missing. The 
ramifications of the lack of incentives in the SDIO contract are 
discussed in further detail in the following section on liability.
Liability/Insurance. With respect to third party liability, all 
three cases have chosen similar paths* In each contract, the 
Government relies on the Contractor's current insurance policy to 
form a base level of coverage, then the Government indemnifies the 
contractor for any liability over the amount of this coverage. In 
each circumstance, the Government would have been required to 
reimburse the Contractor for any additional insurance coverage ovqr 
the amounts that the Commercial Space Launch Act requires the 
Contractor to carry. The Government has obviously decided that the 
risk is not great enough to justify extra expense.
A similar indemnification process occurs with regard to Government 
property (the most notable of which is the payload). In all three 
cases the Government has self-insured the payload and launch 
facilities. The alternative to this is to pay a higher price per 
launch to handle the additional insurance requirements that would 
be forced upon a liable contractor. In the Air Force and NASA 
launch scenarios, the Contractor still has a significant incentive 
to carry out the mission to a successful conclusion, even though it 
has no liability for a lost payload. The previously mentioned 
contractual incentives insure this.
The SDIO LACE/RME contract does not, however, use mission success 
as a factor when determining how much to pay or penalize the 
Contractor. The Contractor receives the full contract price no 
matter what happens to the payload or facilities. Because, the 
LACE/RME launch contract also released the Contractor of liability 
for the payload, there is a question as to what incentives are left
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to steer the Contractor towards a successful conclusion to the 
mission. This dilemma is accentuated by the fact that the SDIO 
launch contained relatively little Government involvement.
Cost of Launch Services. A court injunction levied against the 
release of the NASA contract and threatened against the Air Force 
limited the researchers' comparison of the three agencies' cost 
data. The researchers were able to obtain the SDIO cost data, 
whicih places the cost for services at $35 million and range support 
at $3 million.
The researchers originally hoped to try to develop a relationship 
between the cost of launch services, and the amount of Government 
oversight in the contract. Without detailed cost breakdowns, the 
researchers were unable to accomplish this task.
Reliability- The Delta II launch Vehicle is an extremely reliable 
ELV, especially in recent history. The relatively small population 
of Delta II launches and the fact that virtually every launch has 
been a success, make it difficult to draw a correlation between 
reliability and procurement method. However, the level of 
oversight and use of military standards throughout the production 
of the vehicles, may be a driving force behind the system's 
success. One of the most significant factors that may affect the 
System's reliability is that the Delta has had the opportunity to 
mature of a span of three decades.
CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
The Air Force, NASA and SDIO Delta II launch acquisition process 
may not be individually classified as "good" or "bad," "efficient 11 
or "inefficient," "commercial" or "non-commercial." Each of the 
agencies' processes has aspects that may be desirable if developing 
"an ideal" Government launch procurement process.
Oversight. By employing the streamlined procurement methods 
prevalent in the SDIO contract, such as decreased Contractor 
surveillance, fewer paperwork requirements, and the use of a 
performance oriented specification, the Government would be able to 
ease the Government and Contractor administrative burdens. It 
would essentially acknowledge that the Contractor is indeed the 
true expert. This would allow the Contractor the flexibility to 
innovate, and thus become more efficient. This increased 
efficiency could be transferred to the commercial sector, and 
foster the development of the industry.
Reflight and Award Fees. There are many ways for the Government to 
inspire successful performance. Reflight provisions and award fees 
serve as a potent stimuli for Contractor behavior. The Air Force 
Delta II reflight requirements are a desirable incentive because it 
could potentially affect the Contractor's profitability. NASA's 
performance based award fee is also an indispensable incentive that 
could work in conjunction with a reflight provision. Performance 
is the bottom line. These positive and negative incentives ensure 
it, while helping build improved, and more trusting relationships
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with contractors. This can only lead to more efficiency and 
effectiveness.
Government Self-Insurance for Payloads. Payload insurance can 
place a significant monetary burden on the Contractor, which is 
ultimately passed on in the form of higher fees to the Government. 
Self-insurance is an acceptable risk for the Government if 
reliability remains consistently high. However, Government self- 
insurance must be used in conjunction with Contractor incentives in 
order to manifest the Contractor's stake in the successful 
performance of the mission.
The Role of the Air Force. The Air Force is by far, the largest, 
most influential customer in the domestic space launch market. The 
Air Force effectively drives the Commercial Space Launch Industry. 
Therefore, the Air Force must also play the lead role in developing 
more efficient, effective, and responsible space launch acquisition 
processes.
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